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COMMENT 
FROM PLAYPENS TO PRISONS: 
WHAT THE GANG VIOLENCE AND 
JUVENILE CRIME PREVENTION 
ACT OF 1998 DOES TO 
CALIFORNIA'S JUVENILE JUSTICE 
SYSTEM AND REASONS TO 
REPEAL IT 
Californians deserve to live without fear of violent crime and to 
enjoy safe neighborhoods, parks, and schools. This act ad-
dresses each of these issues with the goal of creating a safer 
California for ourselves and our children, in the twenty-first 
1 
century. 
1. INTRODUCTION 
On March 7, 2000, California voters approved Proposition 
21.2 Proposition 21, an initiative that was titled the Gang 
Violence and Juvenile Crime Prevention Act (GVJCPA), pro-
posed thirty-two changes to the state's Penal Code and Welfare 
1 See GANG VIOLENCE AND JUVENILE CRIME PREVENTION ACT OF 1998, § (2)(k), Bal-
lot Measure 4,1999-2000 Legis. Sess. (Cal. 1999) [hereinafter GVJCPA). 
2 
See California Secretary of State, Vote 2000 California Primary Election Status 
Report on State Ballot Measures (visited on Mar. 8, 2000) <http:INote2000.ss.ca.gov> 
(stating that with one-hundred percent of precincts reporting, sixty-two percent of 
California voters approved of Proposition 21, while only thirty-eight percent had voted 
against it). However, Prop. 21 failed by nearly the same margin in five California 
counties; Marin, San Francisco, Alameda, San Mateo, and Santa Cruz). See id. 
233 
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and Institutions Code.3 These changes have revamped Cali-
fornia's juvenile justice system as well as the methods cur-
rently used to address gang violence.4 As a result, the 
GV JCPA has quickly become California's contribution to the 
growing collection of measures that have been written 
throughout the United States in an effort to "get-tough" on 
gang related and juvenile crime.5 The above quoted passage 
demonstrates that the GV JCPA was designed to protect the 
pUblic.6 However important the goals of public safety and pro-
tection may be, they come at the expense of the minors who 
become involved in crime.7 
By passing the GV JCPA, Californians made fifteen changes 
to the Penal Code which focus on gang-related crimes commit-
ted by adults.s Additionally, Californians approved of seven-
teen substantial changes to the Welfare and Institutions Code, 
all of which focus on the violent quality of crime perpetrated by 
juveniles and impose harsher punishment.9 The legislative 
intent behind the GV JCPA was to deter juveniles from be-
coming involved in crime by trying them as adults and impos-
ing harsher penalties.10 However, the problem inherent in 
"get-tough" legislative solutions such as the GV JCPA is that 
they are not designed to repair the rips in the social fabric that 
are the root causes of gang violence and juvenile crime. 11 
Rather than focus on problems such as poverty, neglect, abuse, 
and violence, the GV JCPA and similar legislation focuses on 
3 
See GVJCPA, supra note 1. 
4 . See ,d. 
5 
See Malcolm C. Young, The Criminal Class of2000 Playing With Juvenile Justice 
on Capitol Hill, LEGAL TIMES, June 30, 1997, at 25. 
6 
See GVJCPA, supra note 1, at § 2. 
7 
See infra notes 260-369 and accompanying text. 
s 
See GV JCPA, supra note 1, at §§ (3)-(17). 
9 . See ,d. §§ (18)-(34). 
10 See Thomas F. Geraghty, Symposium On The Future Of The Juvenile Court: Jus-
tice For Children: How Do We Get There?, 88 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 190 (1997). 
11 . 
See id. 
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punishment while ignoring the underlying causes of juvenile 
• 12 
cnme. 
This comment will explore the most significant changes 
that the GVJCPA made to California's juvenile justice system. 
It will also discuss and propose alternative methods to curb 
juvenile crime. Part II will examine the juvenile justice sys-
tem, including the context in which it was created, and juve-
nile crime across the country. It will then discuss how courts, 
legislatures, and local governments have confronted the 
changing nature of juvenile crime, focusing on efforts in Cali-
fornia. Part II will also include an introduction to the 
GV JCP A. Part III will discuss the most important changes 
that the GV JCPA has made to the juvenile justice system. 
Part III will also examine the history of the incarceration of 
juveniles and the transfer of juveniles to the adult criminal 
courts. Part IV critiques the changes discussed in Part III. 
Part V proposes a reformed juvenile justice system, designed to 
implement the rehabilitative philosophy upon which the sys-
tem was originally founded. Finally, Part V, will explain vari-
ous reasons to repeal the most damaging Sections of the 
GVJCPA. 
II. JUVENILE CRIME IN CALIFORNIA AND THE REST OF THE 
COUNTRY: RESPONSES BY THE COURTS AND LEGISLATURES 
From the inception of the juvenile courts, there has been 
widespread frustration with the system.13 The first juvenile 
court, established in Cook County, Illinois, had only one judge, 
an overabundance of cases, and a lack of funding and support 
for the children that became wards of the court. 14 The second 
presiding judge of that court, the Honorable Julian W. Mack, 
made a habit of placing minors on probation instead of com-
12 
See Laureen D'Ambra, A Legal Response to Juvenile Crime: Why Waiver of Juve-
nile Offenders Is Not a Panacea, 2 ROGER WILLIAMS L. REv. 277, 279 (1997). 
13 
See Geraghty, supra note 10, at 230-231. 
14 . See ,d at 231. 
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mitting them to child care agencies. 15 He did this so that he 
could personally supervise their rehabilitation and ensure that 
these minors were given the necessary attention. 16 
The system described above is that of parens patriae.17 This 
doctrine provided the backbone of the juvenile courts. IS The 
essence of parens patriae19 is that the state, through its courts, 
should act in the best interests of children who have fallen 
through society's cracks.20 Parens patriae empowered Ameri-
can courts to preside over juvenile delinquency proceedings.21 
However, the states' parens patriae power has been curtailed 
over the course of the century.22 As a result, the juvenile 
court's authority and jurisdiction over certain types of cases 
has been challenged.23 
A. A BRIEF HISTORY OF JUVENILE JUSTICE: AMERICAN STYLE 
The juvenile justice system in this country has gone from 
non-existent, to a cause championed by social reformers, to a 
system whose effectiveness is in doubt.24 These changes have 
spanned the course of just one century. In that time, juvenile 
15 See id. 
16 . See Id. 
17 
See Christine Stieb Stickler, Note: In re S.G.; Parens Patriae and Wardship Pro-
ceedings - Exactly Who Should Determine the Best Interests of the Child?, 7 WIDENER 
J. PuBLIC L. 377 (1998). 
IS See Michael Kennedy Burke, This Old Court: Abolitionists Once Again Line Up 
the Wrecking Ball on the Juvenile Court When All It Needs is a Few Minor Alterations, 
26 U. TOL. L. REv. 1027, 1033 (1995). 
19 "Parens patriae" is literally translated as "parent of the country." See BLACK'S 
LAw DICTIONARY 1114 (6th ed. 1990). 20 . See StIckler, supra note 17, at 382. 
21 See id. at 383. 
22 See id. at 382 (citing Meyer v. Nebraska 262 U.S. 390, 399 (1923) (holding that 
custody of a child is more than a privilege; it is something to which a parent has a 
fundamental right». 23 See id. 
24 See Ira M. Schwarz et aI., Nine Lives and Then Some: Why the Juvenile Court 
Does Not Roll Over and Die, 33 WAKE FOREST L. REV. 533, 533 (1998). 
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crime has also changed, appearing to have become more com-
mon and exceedingly violent.25 As a result, federal and state 
courts and legislatures have tried to solve the problem of juve-
nile crime. 26 Local government and community groups have 
also made attempts to do the same.27 
1. The Progressive Movement of the Late Nineteenth Century 
The juvenile justice system is a product of the Progressive 
Movement of the late nineteenth century.28 The Progressives 
were social reformers whose platform focused on social welfare 
and justice.29 In creating the juvenile courts, the Progressives 
had two primary objectives: to protect the general public from 
juvenile crime,30 and to rehabilitate the juvenile offenders.31 
Before the juvenile court was created, juveniles were tried in 
adult criminal courts and sentenced to terms in adult prisons.32 
They were arrested, indicted by a grand jury, tried by a jury, 
and imprisoned in adult prisons if found guilty.33 The only de-
fense available to juvenile offenders was that ofinfancy.34 
25 See Joseph F. Yeckel, Note, Violent Juvenile Offenders: Rethinking Federal Inter· 
vention in Juvenile Justice, 51 WASH U. J. URB. & CONTEMP. L. 331, 332 (1997). 26 See Geraghty, supra note 10, at 191 note 3. 
27 See Schwarz, supra note 32, at 542. 
28 See id. at 534. 
29 See id. at 535. 
30 See Burke, supra note 18, at 1033. 
31 . See id. 
32S . 
ee ,d. at 1032. 
33 See Yeckel, supra note 25, at 334 note 14 (citing Julian W. Mack, The Juvenile 
Court, 23 HARv. L. REV. 104 (1909». 34 
See id. The infancy defense was a common law presumption that children under 
the age of seven were incapable of forming a criminal intent. In addition, there was a 
rebuttable presumption of infancy that was applicable to children between the ages of 
seven and fourteen. These presumptions lost their power in the 1960's as a casualty of 
the Due Process Revolution, during which courts became willing to extend criminal 
safeguards and constitutional protections to juvenile offenders. See D'Ambra, supra 
note 12, at 280. The concept behind the infancy defense is nothing new. It dates back 
to the time of the Greek philosopher Aristotle, who believed that children should not 
be held responsible for anything because they were too young to be capable of making 
5
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The Progressives believed that the punitive system35 that 
was, and still is, used on adult criminals should not be applied 
to children.36 Because the Progressives believed that children 
should not be treated as hardened criminals, they created a 
system based on the belief that juvenile delinquents could be 
reformed.37 The Progressives attributed the responsibility for 
juvenile crime not to the children who were the perpetrators, 
but to a lack of good parenting and a paucity of resources for 
urban youth.3s 
2. The Rise and ''Fall'' of the Juvenile Justice System 
The first juvenile court was established in 1899 in Cook 
County, Illinois.39 The new system diverged from that applica-
ble to adult criminals in four important ways.40 First, the ju-
venile courts were conceived to be a social service agency.41 
Second, rather than punish minors with adult prison sen-
tences, the new juvenile court offered troubled youth guidance 
and assistance designed to keep them in school and out of 
deliberate choices. See Arthur R. Blum, Comment: Disclosing the Identities of Juvenile 
Felons: Introducing Accountability to Juvenile Justice, 27 Loy. U. CHI. L.J. 349, 356 
(1996). 
35 A punitive system necessarily includes fines, punishments, or penalties inflicted 
on an individual by the court for a crime or offense that he has committed. Punitive 
measures may deprive a person of his liberty, property, life, or any other right. See 
BLACK'S LAw DICTIONARY 1234 (6th ed. 1990). 
36 • • See Burke, supra note 18, at 1032. The ProgressIves believed that the adult pu-
nitive system was inappropriate and ineffective in meeting the needs of juvenile 
offenders. See id. Not only were its punitive goals inappropriate for the purposes of 
reforming juvenile offenders, the rigidity and formality of the proceedings and the 
cruelty of the adult prisons were an unacceptable means of treatment. See Blum, 
supra note 34, at 351. 
37 See Burke, supra note 18, at 1032. 
3S See Schwarz, supra note 24, at 535. This theory was derived from the philosophy 
of determinism. Determinism is the theory that human behavior is a product of envi-
ronmental, biological, or social determinants, and not of free will. See Blum, supra 
note 34, at 351. It was clear in the Progressives' minds that the adult criminal justice 
system was an insufficient way to remedy those social ills that the Progressives be-
lieved to be the main contributor to juvenile crime. See Schwarz, supra note 24, at 535. 
39 
See id. at 534-535. 
40 See Burke, supra note 18, at 1035. 
41 See Schwarz, supra note 24, at 534. 
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trouble.42 Third, trials, in which guilt was sought to be proved, 
were no longer held.43 Instead, hearings were held in which 
the court decided how best to rehabilitate and treat each mi-
nor.44 In order to protect minors from the social stigma of a 
public hearing, juvenile cases were heard behind closed doors, 
away from the public eye.45 Fourth, to further protect privacy, 
juvenile records were sealed and then expunged when the mi-
nor reached the age of majority.46 
The most significant result of the creation of a new juvenile 
justice system was that minors were no longer subjected to the 
adult criminal justice system.47 Instead, juvenile cases were 
heard in delinquency proceedings, where the issue was not 
whether the minor was guilty of a particular crime, but 
whether the minor was delinquent.48 Rather than place the 
primary focus on the offense, as would have occurred in adult 
criminal court, the purpose of the juvenile court was to focus 
on the offender.49 Regardless of the offense, juvenile cases 
were heard only to decide whether the minor was delinquent 
and required supervision of the court. 50 For example, a minor 
who committed murder would not be found guilty of murder. 51 
Instead, the minor would simply be found delinquent52 and 
42 
See Burke, supra note 18, at 1032. 
43 See id. at 1033. 
44 . See ld. 
45 
See Yeckel, supra note 25, at 335. 46 . 
See id. 
47 . 
See Geraghty, supra note 10, at 230-232. 
48 See Yeckel, supra note 25, at 334 note 17 (citing Ralph A. Rossurn, Holding Ju-
veniles Accountable: Reforming America's "Juvenile Injustice System, n 22 PEPP. L. REv. 
907,914 (1995)). "Guilty" can be defined as having committed a crime or being justly 
chargeable with a crime. It is further defined as carrying the connotation of evil. See 
BLACK'S LAw DICTIONARY 708 (6th ed. 1990). "Delinquent" may be defined as a child 
who has either violated a criminal law or been disobedient and is in need of rehabilita-
tion or supervision. See BLACK'S LAw DICTIONARY 428 (6th ed. 1990). 49 See Yeckel, supra note 25, at 335. 
50 See id. at 334 note 17 (citing Rossurn, supra note 48, at 914). 
51 . See ld. 
52 See id. 
7
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would thereafter become a ward of the court. 53 The same pro-
ceeding applied to all minors. 54 
Once the minor was adjudged delinquent, the crime that he 
actually committed was treated as a symptom of the disease of 
delinquency. 55 Treatment was tailored on an individual basis, 
depending on the specific facts of each minor's case.56 The the-
ory was that if the minor was placed in a juvenile hall or other 
child care agency, his needs could be addressed and served bet-
ter than they would have been in an adult prison. 57 Slowly, ju-
venile courts began to incorporate professionals from the social 
sciences into the judicial process.58 This integration of disci-
plines was a response to the growing realization that rehabili-
tation would be effective only if the juvenile offenders were 
treated as children as opposed to adults. 59 As a result, special 
attention had to be paid to the emotional and behavioral devel-
opment of the wards of the court.60 
3. Changes in Juvenile Crime 
The juvenile court docket has always been filled with delin-
quency, dependency and status offense cases.61 Delinquency 
cases involve minors who commit criminal offenses.62 Depend-
ency cases address the needs of minors who have been abused 
or neglected.63 Status offense cases involve non-criminal acts 
53 See Geraghty, supra note 10, at 230-232. 
54 
See Yeckel, supra note 25, at 334 note 17 (citing Rossum, supra note 48, at 914). 
55 See id. 
56 See id. 
57 See Geraghty, supra note 10, at 230-232. 
58 See Schwarz, supra note 24, at 536. 
59 See id. at 535-536. 
60 See id. 
61 See id. at 537. 
62 See Schwarz, supra note 24, at 542. 
63 
See id. at 537. 
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committed by minors,64 and include school truancy, running 
away from home, and curfew violations.65 Traditionally, the 
juvenile court was primarily concerned with status offenses.66 
However, delinquency cases have taken center stage in the ju-
venile court.67 This shift is the result of a perception that vio-
lent juvenile crime has increased dramatically.68 As a result, 
state legislatures and courts across the country have consid-
ered reforms, and even abolition, of the juvenile justice 
69 
system. 
B. STATE RESPONSES TO THE INCREASE AND CHANGE IN 
JUVENILE CRIME 
Rather than abandon their juvenile courts, many states 
have chosen to modify their existing systems.70 In general, the 
changes have focused on delinquency offenses and mandate 
harsher punishment within the existing juvenile justice sys-
tem.7l Changes have also created increased conditions under 
which minors may be tried and sentenced as adults.72 States 
justify this development in three ways: first, the threat of se-
vere punishment will deter juveniles from becoming involved 
in crime; second, juveniles who are incarcerated will be unable 
to commit more crime; and third, punishment gives society the 
64 . See ,d. at 542. 
65 See id. 
66 See Schwarz, supra note 24, at 542. 
67 See Geraghty, supra note 10, at 191 note 2. 
68 See Burke, supra note 18, at 1030-1031. See also infra notes 329-338 and accom-
panying text. 
69 See id. Abolitionists cite three reasons why the juvenile courts should be dis-
mantled. One, the atmosphere created by United States Supreme Court decisions 
guaranteeing minors procedural due process nearly mirrors adult criminal courts. See 
id. at 1028. Two, abolition would result in substantial monetary savings, as a second 
justice system would not need to be maintained. See id. Three, the system as it 
stands is too soft on juvenile crime, as evidenced by the high juvenile crime rate. See 
id. at 1029. 70 See Geraghty, supra note 10, at 191 note 3. 
7l See id at 192 note 6. 
72 
See id. 
9
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satisfaction of holding juvenile offenders publicly accountable 
for their crimes.73 Several states have even revised the stat-
utes that provide for their juvenile courts to reflect a growing 
concern for public protection.74 
In addition to revising existing law, states have tried other 
methods to discourage minors from becoming involved in seri-
ous crime.75 The most drastic example of such efforts is Okla-
homa's attempt to apply the death penalty to certain juvenile 
offenders.76 However, the United States Supreme Court struck 
down this use of the death penalty in Thompson v. 
Oklahoma. 77 In Thompson, a fifteen year-old boy was tried and 
convicted of first-degree murder for the brutal beating and 
drowning death of his brother-in-Iaw.78 Under an Oklahoma 
statute that gave the juvenile court the discretion to transfer 
minors to adult criminal court,79 the fifteen year-old boy was 
tried as an adult.80 The boy was subsequently convicted and 
sentenced to death.81 The Court overturned the death sen-
tence, holding that to sentence a fifteen year-old to death con-
73 
See Yeckel, supra note 25, at 345-346. 
74. . See generally Yeckel, supra note 25, at 350 note 99 (CIting WASH. REV. CODE ANN. 
§ 13.40.010(2) (West 1993) which provides that "it is the intent of the legislature that 
youth be held accountable for their offenses;" HAw. REv. STAT. § 571-1 (1985), which 
calls upon the juvenile courts to "render appropriate punishment to offenders;" CAL. 
WELF. & INST. CODE § 202 (West Supp. 1996), which provides "for the protection and 
safety of the public;" and NY FAM. CT. ACT § 301.1 (McKinney 1983), which reads that 
the "court shall consider [. .. ] the need for protection ofthe community."). 75 See Burke, supra note 18, at 1030-1031. 
76 See Thompson v. Oklahoma, 487 U.S. 815 (1988). 
77 See id. 
78 See id. at 819. 
79 See id. at 818. Prior to the March 7, 2000 election, California also employed judi-
cial waiver. See infra notes 200-239 and accompanying text. 80 See id. at 819-820 (1988). 
81 
See Thompson, supra note 76, at 820. 
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stituted cruel and unusual punishment, and therefore, the 
punishment as applied was unconstitutiona1.82 
C. FEDERAL INVOLVEMENT IN JUVENILE JUSTICE 
Although the states have historically been responsible for 
the creation and maintenance of their juvenile justice 
systems ,83 the federal government has also addressed the 
problems created by the escalation in juvenile crime.84 In 1974, 
Congress passed the Juvenile Justice and Delinquency Preven-
tion Act (the Act) in response to the rise in delinquency of-
fenses. 85 Congress intended to encourage the states to devise 
alternatives to institutionalizing juvenile offenders, and to de-
velop community-based preventive programs.86 
To entice them to participate, the Act provides financial in-· 
centives to states that implement the federally mandated pro-
grams.87 To receive federal funding, states are required to 
satisfy three requirements.88 First, all status offenders must 
be deinstitutionalized.89 Second, any juvenile offenders that 
remain in institutions must be placed in facilities where they 
will be completely separated from incarcerated adults.90 Third, 
states wishing to benefit from the program are required to es-
82 See id. at 830. The Eighth Amendment prohibits the state from inflicting cruel 
and unusual punishment. See U.S. CONST. amend. VIII. The Thompson Court rea-
soned that the normal fifteen year-old is not equipped with the faculties of a compara-
ble adult. AIl a result, there is no logical way that the state should expect him to as-
sume full responsibility through the applicable adult punishment. See Thompson, 
supra note 76, at 824. 83 See Yeckel, supra note 25, at 333. 
84 See id. 
85 See JUVENILE JUSTICE AND DELINQUENCY PREVENTION ACT OF 1974, Pub. L. no. 
93-415, 88 Stat. 1109, codified in part at 42 U.S.C. § 5633 (1999). 86 See 42 U.S.C. § 5633 (a)(10)(A) (1999). 
87 
See id. 
88 See generally 42 U.S.C. § 5633 (1999). 
89 See 42 U.S.C. § 5633 (a)(12)(A) (1999). 
90 See 42 U.S.C. § 5633 (a)(13) (1999). 
11
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tablish a system to monitor juvenile detention facilities to en-
sure that institutionalized juveniles do not come into contact 
with incarcerated adults.91 
In addition to deinstitutionalizing status offenders, cities 
and states wishing to receive federal funding under the Act 
must fulfill three additional conditions unrelated to status of-
fenders. 92 First, the community is required to organize a Local 
Prevention Policy Board, composed of representatives with 
backgrounds in social sciences, crime prevention or juvenile 
law.93 Second, the community must submit to the state a 
three-year plan for juvenile crime prevention.94 Third, each 
community is required to match fifty percent of the federal 
grant, either in cash or in kind.95 
A total of fifty-six states and U.S. territories have received 
federal funding through the Act.96 However, the consensus 
among the participants is that the Act, while helpful, has been 
largely ineffective.97 The reasons for this discontent are sev-
eral.98 First, the federal funding is too limited.99 Second, the 
problem of juvenile crime is too large for the resources pro-
vided by the federal government.100 Third, the Office of Juve-
nile Justice Delinquency and Prevention must be modernized 
91 
See id. 
92 See Janet Quist, Congress Plans to Grapple with Crime Issues, NATION'S CITIES 
WEEKLY, February 3,1997, at 15. 
93 See id. 
94 
See id. 
95 See id. 
96 See Prepared Statement of Lavonda Taylor on behalf of the Coalition for Juvenile 
Justice, before the Senate Judiciary Committee Subcommittee on Youth Violence, May 
8,1996 [hereinafter Statement of Lavonda Taylor]. 
97 See id. 
98 See id. See also Testimony of Clayton Hollopeter, executive Director of the Boys 
and Girls Clubs of San Gabriel Valley, before the House of Representatives Committee 
on Education and the Workforce, April 1, 1997 [hereinafter Statement of Clayton 
Hollopeter]. 
99 See Statement of Lavonda Taylor, supra note 96. 
100 See id. 
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to keep up with the changes in juvenile crime.101 Fourth, the 
funding provided by the Act is too minimal to make a substan-
tial difference in the social problems that contribute to juvenile 
crime. 102 Fifth, the financial requirements of the Act are too 
burdensome for rural or depressed states to comply.103 
In addition to financial incentives, the federal government 
has also provided means by which minors may be removed en-
tirely from the state system and tried as adults in federal 
court. 104 For example, a federal prosecutor may invoke juris-
diction over a juvenile if the state lacks or refuses to assert 
jurisdiction, the state's programs do not meet the needs of the 
juvenile, or there is a substantial federal interest in the prose-
cution.10s Similarly, another federal provision allows federal 
prosecutors to try juvenile offenders as adults.106 
Federal involvement in juvenile crime is not limited to stat-
utes. It has also been exhibited through the role played by the 
United States Supreme Court.107 During the Due Process 
revolution of the late 1960's and early 1970's the power of the 
Court was used to guarantee procedural safeguards for 
. minors,108 addressing such issues as· the constitutionality of 
waiver109 and the prosecution's burden of proof.110 However, 
101 See Testimony of Clayton Hollopeter, supra note 98. 
102 See Statement of Lavonda Taylor, supra note 96. 
103 See Janet Quist, NLC Testifies on Juvenile Justice Mandates; National League 
of Cities, Juvenile Justice Delinquency and Prevention Act, NATION'S CITIES WEEKLY, 
May 12,1997, at 16. 
104 See 18 U.S.C. § 5032 (1999). 
105 . See ,d. 
106 See id. This transfer is permitted in three circumstances: (1) the juvenile con-
sents to an adult trial; (2) the attorney general requests an adult trial if the juvenile is 
charged with a violent felony; or (3) by mandatory transfer to adult criminal court by 
virtue of the fact that the juvenile is sixteen years of age or older and is charged with 
certain serious offenses. See id. 107 See Burke, supra note 18, at 1029. 
108 See Geraghty, supra note 10, at 231. 
109 See Kent v. U.S., 383 U.S. 541 (1966). 
110 See In re Winship, 397 U.S. 358 (1970). 
13
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the Court's decision in In re Gault, 111 decided in 1967, solidified 
minors' rights to due process.112 
In Gault, a fifteen year old boy was taken into police cus-
tody after a neighbor complained that he made obscene phone 
calls to her residence. 113 The Court determined that several of 
the events surrounding the boy's detention and disposition 
violated his rights to due process.114 First, his parents were not 
notified of the arrest. 115 Second, the boy was not served with 
notice that a petition against him had been filed. 116 Third, as 
the complaining witness did not attend the hearing, the boy 
was deprived of his right to confront his accuser.ll7 
D. LOCAL GOVERNMENT RESPONSES TO JUVENILE CRIME 
Despite efforts made by state and federal officials to curb 
juvenile crime, the most effective steps are often those taken 
by local government or private community groupS.118 Curfews, 
locally sponsored teen centers, diversion programs, and new 
types of juvenile halls have all been implemented throughout 
California. These steps are usually taken at the initiative of 
city government and have varying degrees of success.119 
111 387 U.S. 1 (1967). 
112. .. See td. In reVIewmg Gerald Gault's case, the Court extended several procedural 
safeguards to juveniles in delinquency proceedings. First, a juvenile in a delinquency 
proceeding has a right to be notified of the charges against him. See id, at 33-34. 
Second, such a lninor has a right to counsel. See id, at 35. Third, he also has a right 
to confront and cross examine his accuser. See id, at 56-57. Fourth, a lninor has a 
right against self incrimination. See Gault, 387 U.S. 1 at 56. 113 See id. at 4. 
114 
See id. 
115 
See id. at 5. 
116 
See id. 
117 
See Gault, 387 U.S. at 5. 
118 
See Schwarz, supra note 24, at 542. 
119 See supra notes 120-160 and accompanying text. 
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1. Curfews 
Curfews are a popular tool used by local law enforcement 
agencies to reduce juvenile crime.120 Their use has been urged 
by such leaders as United States President Bill Clinton, former 
California Governor Pete Wilson, and former California Attor-
ney General Dan Lungren.121 However, despite the enormous 
popularity of imposing curfews, recent studies suggest that 
although the overall juvenile crime rate has declined, little 
evidence links that decline to the implementation of curfews.122 
A 1998 study conducted by the Justice Policy Institute (JpI)123 
showed that curfews have had little impact whatsoever on ju-
venile crime when comparing statistics by location and type of 
crime. 124 In fact, the most significant impact of California's 
curfews appeared to be an increase in juvenile crime.125 In par-
ticular, marked increases were noted statewide in misde-
meanor arrest rates for Caucasian, Hispanic, and Asian mi-
126 
nors. 
120 See Teresa Moore, Youth Curfews Don't Cut Crime, Study Says, San Jose Offi· 
cial Disputes Advocacy Group's Findings, S.F. CHRONICLE, June 10, 1998, at A14. 
121 See Dan Macallair and Mike Males, The Impact of Juvenile Curfew Laws in 
California, study published by the Justice Policy Institute (1998) [hereinafter JPI 
Curfew Study]. 122 See Moore, supra note 120. The city of San Jose, California has instituted what 
it considers to be a highly successful curfew. Soon after the results of the JPI study 
were released, the city's gang policy manager, Dick de la Rosa, disputed the findings 
that the reduction in juvenile crime cannot be linked to curfews. He explained that the 
success of San Jose's curfew depended upon the fact that it was used for the purpose of 
intervening in juvenile crime, as opposed to using it to suppress juvenile crime. When 
minors in San Jose are picked up for violating the curfew, they are taken to a place 
where their individual situations are evaluated. Those minors are given access to 
counseling as well as referrals to agencies that may be able to serve them and their 
families. See id. 
123 The Justice Policy Institute is a branch of the Center on Juvenile Crime and 
Justice. It was created to research juvenile justice issues and to develop policy ac· 
cording to its results. See Justice Policy Institute website (visited Feb. 2, 2000) 
<http://www.cjcj.org/jpi>. 124 See JPI Curfew Study, supra note 121. 
125 See id. 
126 
See id. 
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Most curfews do not seem to work because they are not 
used to intervene in juvenile crime.127 Rather, they are used to 
prevent it. 128 Curfews that do nothing more than remove mi-
nors from the street and take them to detention centers may be 
successful in stopping juvenile crime before it starts, but do 
little to remedy the social problems that contribute to delin-
quency.129 JPI explained that curfews are largely ineffective 
because they are either used to deter130 or incapacitate.131 De-
terrent curfews provide certain and swift punishment to mi-
nors who are on the streets at prohibited times.132 Law en-
forcement hopes that such curfews will cause minors to think 
of the punishment and choose not to break curfew.133 Likewise, 
curfews that are used to incapacitate minors are rooted in the 
theory that juvenile crime is only committed by a select group 
of minors.134 Curfews of this nature are often applied selec-
tively, targeting repeat offenders and minors on probation who 
are known to the police. 135 Curfews that incapacitate are not 
only ineffective, but have been criticized as being unconstitu-
tional because they are unequally applied. 136 
2. Locally and Privately Sponsored Teen Centers 
Teen centers were established to assist in preventing juve-
nile crime by offering minors an alternative to being left unsu-
pervised.137 Instead of wandering the streets, minors are en-
couraged to come to the teen centers where they can partici-
127 See Moore, supra note 120. 
128 
See id. 
129 
See id. 
130 
See JPI Curfew Study, supra note 121. 
131 
See id. 
132 
See id. 
133 See id. 
134 
See id. 
135 
See JPI Curfew Study, supra note 121. 136 
See id. 
137 See Tanya Schevitz, Centering on Teens: Trying to Curtail Juvenile Crimes, Cit-
ies Create Places for Young People to Gather, S.F. CHRONICLE, Oct. 19, 1998, at A17. 
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pate in various activities.13B Most towns that build teen centers 
involve the teens themselves in designing the centers and 
planning the activities. 139 As a result, teen centers have grown 
in popularity in the last several years, and have been estab-
lished in many towns and cities throughout California.140 Be-
tween 1993 and 1998, the number of teen centers in California 
grew by thirty percent.141 
Local law enforcement agencies find that teen centers are 
more effective than curfews in preventing juvenile crinie. 142 
Teen centers provide minors with a recreational outlet, while 
curfews are simply a law enforcement tool. 143 Several Califor-
nia towns report that since opening teen centers, they have 
experienced declines in both violent juvenile offenses and in 
drug and alcohol offenses. 144 Studies show that teen centers in 
urban areas reap similar benefits, in effect breaking down ra-
cial and social tension between neighborhoods that might oth-
. t . . I 145 eI'Wlse erup In VIO ence. 
3. Diversion Programs 
The diversion program is another juvenile crime prevention 
tool that is growing in popularity among local law enforcement 
13B See id. Offerings range from Saturday night concerts and dance parties, to af-
ternoon cooking classes, opportunities to participate in sports or the arts, or simply a 
chance to do nothing at all in a safe environment. See id. 
139 See id. 
140 See id. 
141 See Schevitz, supra note 137. 
142 See id. Teenagers are also positive about the effect of teen centers on their 
communities. They enjoy going to the teen centers because they are treated as adults 
when they are there. In return, the teens gain a sense of maturity and independence. 
The only downside to teen centers is that older minors tend to lose interest in them, 
causing some towns to refocus their services to younger teens or, in extreme cases, to 
close their doors. See id. 
143 See id. 
144 
See id. 
145 See Schevitz, supra note 137. 
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agencies. 146 Diversion programs are rooted in the philosophy of 
restorative justice.147 Rather than relying on the courts, re-
storative justice emphasizes the involvement of the victim, the 
offender, and the community in disposing of a criminal 
charge. 148 When employed in the context of juvenile law, re-
storative justice effectively diverts minors away from the juve-
nile justice system entirely.149 Instead, the minor's case is dis-
posed of within the community where he lives and where the 
offense occurred.150 The goals of such diversion programs are 
to give the victims closure, instill in the offenders the human 
impact of their actions, and compensate the victims through 
t 't t' 151 res 1 u IOn. 
Most diversion programs only handle first-time misde-
meanor and traffic offenders. 152 The programs are typically 
informal, conducted within the community by local law en-
forcement officers.153 The minor is required to playa large role 
in determining how to dispose of his case. l54 In so doing, he is 
required to accept full responsibility for his actions. 155 Fur-
thermore, there are many benefits of diversion programs.156 
146 See Marianne McConnell, Mediation: An Alternative Approach for the New Jer-
sey Juvenile Justice System?, 20 SETON HALL LEGIS. J. 433, 438 (1996). 147 
See id. See also RANDOM HOUSE WEBSTER'S COLLEGE DICTIONARY, 1108. (de-
fining "restorative" as anything that is capable of renewing health or strength). 148 See McConnell, supra note 146, at 438. 
149 See id. 
150 See Schwarz, supra note 24, at 542. 
151 See McConnell, supra note 146, at 438 note 21. 
152 See Det. Craig F. Cooper, Orinda's Juvenile Diversion Program, THE ORINDA 
NEWS, September/October 1999, 15. 153 See id. 
154 See id. 
155 See id. 
156 See id. Orinda, California is a small city east of San Francisco which has insti-
tuted a successful diversion program. In Orinda, juvenile offenders and their parents 
who wish to partake in the diversion program must sign a contract with the local 
police department. The contract details the way in which the minor's case will be dis-
posed. The minor, the victim, the parents or guardians, and the police discuss the 
disposition prior to signing the contract. Dispositions range from restitution and writ-
18
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For instance, the minor is kept out of the juvenile justice sys-
t 157 Th . 1 ., h' 't 158 U 11 em. e mInor a so remaIns In IS communI y. sua y 
the victims are satisfied with the results. 159 Finally, diverting 
first-time misdemeanor offenders away from the juvenile jus-
tice system creates room within that system for more serious 
and violent juvenile offenders.16o 
E. THE CREATION OF THE GANG VIOLENCE AND JUVENILE 
CRIME PREVENTION ACT 
In the last one hundred years the crimes and offenses com-
mitted by minors have become increasingly violent.161 Rather 
than focusing on the social factors at the root of this increase 
in violence, the prevailing reaction at both the federal and 
state levels has been to "get_tough.,,162 As a result, the focus of 
the juvenile justice system has begun to shift from a system 
designed to rehabilitate wayward children, to one that protects 
and vindicates the public by incarcerating juvenile delin-
quents. 163 California's GVJCPA is one such "get-tough" re-
t · '1 . 164 sponse 0 Juvem e cnme. 
ten apologies, to attending drug and alcohol counseling and performing community 
service. Petitions are only filed in juvenile court if the minor fails to perform his con-
tract. However, if the minor fully performs his part of the contract, the case is closed. 
A file of the disposition is then maintained at the police department until the minor's 
eighteenth birthday, at which point it is destroyed. See Cooper, supra note 152. 
157 See id. 
158 See id. 
159 See id. 
160 See McConnell, supra note 146, at 438. 
161 See Geraghty, supra note 10, at 191 note 2. 
162 
See id. 
163 See id. 
164 See e.g. Van Jones, Taking on the Youth Crime Initiative, ACLU News, Novem-
ber-December 1999 (visited on February 2, 2000) <http://www.aclu.org> [hereinafter 
ACLU News] (describing the GVJCPA as "a massive incarceration measure," that will 
"effectively [turnlloose several thousand Kenneth Starrs on the state's children."). All 
fifty states have enacted statutes that allow minors to be tried as adults. In the last 
six years, forty-three states have made those laws more lenient, in favor of prosecuting 
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In 1998, to garner public support for a new ballot measure, 
the GV JCPA, former California Governor Pete Wilson 165 wrote 
about a need for tougher laws concerning juvenile offenders.166 
Governor Wilson noted that although the crime rate in Cali-
fornia was lower than it had been in thirty years, crimes com-
mitted by juveniles between 1967 and 1995 had skyrocketed 
d 167 G 260 percent for robbery and 300 percent for mur er. over-
nor Wilson called for sweeping reforms in juvenile law that he 
claimed were long overdue.168 
Prior to Governor Wilson's announcement of the GV JCPA, 
the California legislature attempted to "get-tough" on juvenile 
crime numerous times between 1995 and 1998.169 Despite the 
effort, eleven of the tougher bills that faced a vote in Califor-
nia's legislature were defeated before reaching the Governor's 
desk.170 Those eleven pieces of failed legislation became the 
GVJCPA. l7l With the assistance of the California District At-
torneys Association, which drafted the final version of the bal-
l 172 fi d· f d 173 d ot measure, un lng rom corporate onors, an an army 
minors as adults. See Tamar Lewin, Racial Discrepancy Found in Trying of Youths, 
NEW YORK TIMES, February 3, 2000 at A14. 
165 See generally, Who's Who in American Politics (October, 1997). Pete Wilson, a 
representative of the Republican Party, was Governor of California for two terms, 
starting in 1991. See id. 166 See Pete Wilson, The Governor vs. The Gangs, S.F. EXAMINER, Aug. 2, 1998, at 
D7. 167 See id. 
168 See id. 
169 
Telephone Interview with Tracy Kenny, Legislative Analyst, OA Sec. of State, 
Aug. 3,1999 [hereinafter Tracy Kenny]. 
170 [d. The bills from the 1995-1996 legislative session are AB. 2723, AB. 3224, 
and AB. 2143. The bills from the 1997-1998 legislative session are AB. 1031, A.B. 
1538, AB. 987, AB. 26, S.B. 1229, S.B. 1333, and S.B. 688. [d. 
171 [d. 
172 [d. The California District Attorneys Association is an organization whose pur-
pose is to educate prosecutors and advocate on their behalf in the political arena. See 
California District Attorneys Association website (visited Feb. 2, 2000) 
<http://www.cdaa.org>. 173 See Bob Egelko, Voters Get Tough on Teen Criminals, THE CONTRA COSTA 
TIMES, March 8, 2000, at A8. 
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of petitioners, the GV JCPA was slated for the March 2000 
election. 174 By virtue of its thirty-two provisions, the GV JCPA 
facilitates the transfer of juveniles to adult criminal court, and 
calls for the prohibition of sealing juvenile records. 175 
The GV JCPA cites several compelling statistics concerning 
juvenile crime rates in California and the rest of the country. 
For instance, the United States Department of Justice re-
ported in 1996 that the rate of juvenile arrests for the commis-
sion of serious crimes rose forty-six percent between 1983 and 
1992.176 Additionally, the California Department of Justice 
reported that the number of juveniles committing murder dou-
bled and the rate of arrests for violent offenses rose fifty-four 
percent between 1986 and 1995.177 By relying o~ these statis-
tics, supporters of the GV JCPA hope to demonstrate that the 
juvenile justice system as it has existed for one hundred years 
d k 178 oes not wor . 
The GVJCPA has overhauled California's juvenile justice 
system. 179 It describes the traditional juvenile court's philoso-
phy of rehabilitation and treatment as inadequate and ill-
equipped to handle the substantial growth in increasingly vio-
lent juvenile offenses.18o It also paints the juvenile justice sys-
tem as one unable to respond to a perceived need for public 
protection from juvenile offenders. 181 The GVJCPA's over-
arching concern is that as the per-capita number of teenagers 
174 
Tracy Kenny, supra note 169. 
175 See GVJCPA, supra note 1. All thirty-two proposals in the GVJCPA can be 
found in one of the eleven pieces of failed legislation. Tracy Kenny, supra note 177. 
176 See GVJCPA, supra note 1, § 2(A). 
177 S 'd ee, . 
178 See Burke, supra note 18, at 1027. 
179 See GVJCPA, supra note 1, § 2(1). 
180 
See id. 
181 See id. 
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increases in California, so too will California's juvenile crime 
182 
rate. 
III. THE MOST SIGNIFICANT CHANGES PRESENTED BY THE 
GVJCPA 
Half of the GV JCPA rewrote the Welfare and Institutions 
Code in an effort to correct the problem of serious and violent 
juvenile crime,183 while the other half fine-tuned provisions of 
the Penal Code concerning gang-related crime. 184 Although 
some of the changes to the Penal Code may have a positive ef-
fect on California's war on gang-related crime,185 those parts of 
the GV JCPA are not the focus of this Comment and will not be 
discussed. Rather, the purpose of this Comment is to closely 
analyze and assess California's juvenile law prior to March 7, 
2000 and to evaluate the GVJCPA's changes. Thus, only the 
most significant of the changes to the Welfare and Institutions 
Code will be addressed. 
A. THE JURISDICTION OF THE JUVENILE COURTS 
Welfare and Institutions Code Section 602 once provided 
the juvenile court with jurisdiction over any person who was 
under the age of eighteen at the time he was alleged to have 
violated any state or federal law, or any local or county ordi-
nance.
186 The GV JCPA essentially retains this basis for juris-
182 See id. at § 2(D). 
183 See id. at §§ 18-34. 
184 See GVJCPA, supra note 1, §§ 3-17. 
185 See id. §§ 3-17. Section 4 of the GVJCPA amends § 186.22 of the Penal Code, 
creating an aggravating circumstance for any person who commits a gang-related 
felony offense on the grounds of or within 1,000 feet of a school. Section 4 of the 
GVJCPA also mandates life sentences for anyone convicted of certain felonies with the 
intent of promoting or assisting a criminal street gang. Section 6 of the GVJCPA adds 
§ 186.26 to the Penal Code, creating a felony offense for soliciting minors to join or 
assist a gang. Section 7 of the GVJCPA, adding § 186.30 to the Penal Code, requires 
anyone convicted of a gang-related crime to register with the local sheriff's office 
within ten days of being released from custody. See id. 
186 See CAL. WELF. AND INST. CODE § 602 (Deering 1999). 
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diction. 187 However, the GVJCPA creates a large exception for 
minors aged fourteen and over who are alleged to have com-
mitted certain crimes.188 In effect, the exception statutorily 
excludes a large number of minors from the juvenile justice 
system. 189 Minors as young as fourteen years old may now be 
automatically transferred out of the juvenile system.190 Their 
cases will subsequently be heard in adult criminal court ac-
cording to the rules of criminal procedure. 191 
Furthermore, this amendment results in a substantial de-
viation from judicial waiver, the only system used in California 
prior to the March 7, 2000 election to transfer minors to adult 
court. 192 Judicial waiver requires the prosecuting officer to re-
quest a fitness hearing, at which the judge determines whether 
the minor is unfit for treatment within the juvenile system.193 
Under judicial waiver, the decision to transfer a minor to adult 
court lies in the hands of the judge.194 The new Section 602(b) 
eliminates most of that judicial discretion.195 As a result, a 
187 See GVJCPA, supra note 1, § 18, 1999-2000 Legis. Sess. (Cal. 1999). 
188 See id. The crimes that automatically remove a minor aged fourteen or older 
from the jurisdiction of the juvenile courts are murder (where the minor is alleged to 
have killed the victim personally), or one of seven sex offenses. The seven sex offenses 
are: (1) rape, (2) spousal rape, (3) forcible sex offenses in concert with another, (4) 
forcible lewd and lascivious acts on a child under the age of four, (5) forcible penetra-
tion by a foreign object, (6) sodomy or oral copulation by force, violence, duress, men-
ace, or fear of bodily injury, and (7) lewd and lascivious acts on a child under the age of 
fourteen years. See id. 
189 See Juvenile Justice: Prosecution of Minors in Adult Criminal Court; Confiden-
tiality; Juvenile Records Sealing; Other Juvenile Court Matters: Hearing on A.B. 2723 
Before the Senate Comm. on Crim. Proc., 1995-1996 Legis. Sess. (Cal. 1996) (author 
unavailable) [hereinafter Hearing on A.B. 2723]. 
190 
See id. 
191 
See id. 
192 See CAL. WELF. AND INST. CODE § 707 (Deering 1999). 
193 
See id. 
194 See Hearing on A.B. 2723, supra note 189. 
195 
See id. 
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large number of minors who once would have been entitled to a 
fitness hearing are no longer so entitled.196 
B. INCREASED PROSECUTORIAL POWER TO TRANSFER MINORS TO 
ADULT CRIMINAL COURT 
Prior to the recent election, judicial waiver, codified in Sec-
tion 707 of the Welfare and Institutions Code, was the only 
system used in California to waive juvenile offenders to adult 
court. 197 Several amendments to Section 707 were made by 
Section 26 of the GV JCP A. 198 These amendments removed the 
discretion that now lies with the court, and instead places it 
with the prosecutors. 199 
1. California's Judicial Waiver System, as it was Codified in 
Welfare and Institutions Code Section 707 Prior to the March 7, 
2000 Election200 
Before the March 7, 2000 election, the court had the discre-
tion to waive jurisdiction over juvenile cases in which the mi-
nor was at least sixteen years old when alleged to have com-
mitted any crime that was not listed in Section 707(b).201 
When the prosecutor filed a motion to conduct a fitness hear-
ing, the court would conduct an investigation to determine 
whether the minor was fit to be treated within the juvenile 
justice system.202 The criteria evaluated by the judge included: 
196 
See id. Provisions for a fitness hearing are currently made under Section 707 of 
the of the California Welfare and Institutions Code. For a discussion of Section 707, 
see infra notes 197·239 and accompanying text. 197 
See CAL. WELF. AND INST. CODE § 707 (Deering 1999). 
198 
See GVJCPA, supra note 1, § 26. 
199 
See Hearing on A.B. 2723, supra note 189. 
200 
See CAL. WELF. AND INST. CODE § 707 (Deering 1999). 
201 
See CAL. WELF. AND INST. CODE § 707(a) (Deering 1999). The 707(b) crimes cur· 
rently include, but are not limited to: murder, arson, robbery, rape or sodomy by force, 
several forms of kidnapping, attempted murder, assault, and caIjacking. See id. 
202 
See id. 
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(1) the minor's criminal sophistication;203 (2) the chance that 
the minor is capable of being rehabilitated;204 (3) the minor's 
previous encounters with the law;205 (4) the success of the juve-
nile justice system's previous attempts to rehabilitate the mi-
nor;206 and (5) the circumstances and gravity of the crime 
h 207 C arged. 
Section 707 included limited circumstances under which a 
minor would be presumed unfit for juvenile court.208 A minor 
aged sixteen or older would be presumed unfit upon a determi-
nation by the judge that, at a time prior to the current allega-
tion, he was at least sixteen when he committed a 707(b) 
crime.209 The 707(b) crimes included murder,210 arson,2l1 rob-
b 212 213 kid . 214 1· h fi 215 ery, rape, nappmg, assau t WIt a lrearm, manu-
facturing or selling half an ounce of a controlled substance,216 
escape by force from a juvenile hall,217 torture,218 and carjack-
ing.219 A minor could overcome a presumption of unfitness only 
if he could produce substantial evidence that he was indeed 
203 See id. § 707(a)(1). 
204 See id. § 707(a)(2). 
205 See CAL. WELF. AND INST. CODE § 707(a)(3) (Deering 1999). 
206 See id. § 707(a)(4). 
207 See id. § 707(a)(5). 
208 See id. § 707(b) and (c). 
209 See id. § 707(c). 
210 See CAL. WELF. AND INST. CODE § 707(b)(1) (Deering 1999). 
211 See id. § 707(b)(2). 
212 See id. § 707(b)(3). 
213 See id. § 707(b)(4). 214 . 
See id. § 707(b)(9), (10), (11), (26), (27). 
215 See CAL. WELF. AND INST. CODE § 707(b)(13) <Deering 1999). 
216 See id. § 707(b)(20). 
217 See id. § 707(b)(22). 
218 See id. § 707(b)(23). 
219 See id. § 707(b)(25). 
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amenable to the treatments offered by the juvenile system. 220 
The court could also consider any extenuating or mitigating 
circumstances.221 It was also possible for a minor as young as 
fourteen years old to become the subject of a fitness hearing if, 
at the age of eleven or older, he had committed one of the 
707(b) crimes.222 
2. How the GVJCPA Has Changed Section 707 and Judicial 
Waiver 
The amendments to Section 707 included within the 
GVJCPA lowered the age at which fitness hearings become 
appropriate, from sixteen years old to fourteen years old.223 
This change permits a minor as young as fourteen years old to 
be automatically transferred to adult criminal court.224 Addi-
tionally, a minor aged sixteen or older shall be presumed unfit 
if he committed two or more other felony offenses when he was 
at least fourteen years of age.225 
If a minor is aged fourteen or fifteen, the GV JCPA provides 
that prosecutorial waiver be invoked in cases not automatically 
waived under the proposed amendment to Section 602.226 For 
the prosecutor to waive a fourteen or fifteen year-old to adult 
criminal court, one of three special circumstances must be pre-
sent:227 (1) the minor must be accused of committing a crime 
that would be punishable by death or life imprisonment had it 
220 See CAL. WELF. AND INST. CODE § 707(c) (Deering 1999). 
221 See id. § 707(c). 
222 See id. § 707(d). 
223 . 
See GVJCPA, supra note 1, § 26. 
224 See id. 
225 See id. Specifically, within § 26, refer to CAL. WELF. AND INST. CODE § 707 
(a)(2). 
226 See id. Specifically, within § 26, refer to CAL. WELF. AND INST. CODE § 707 
(d)(2). See also supra notes 186-196 and accompanying text. 
227 . . . See GVJCPA, supra note 1, § 26. Specifically, WIthin § 26, refer to CAL. WELF. 
AND INST. CODE § 707(d)(2). 
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been committed by an adult;228 (2) the minor allegedly used a 
firearm in the commission of a felony;229 or (3) the minor cur-
rently stands accused of committing any crime in conjunction 
with a criminal street gang,230 any offense committed for the 
purpose of intimidating or interfering with the victim's consti-
tutional rights,231 any crime against a victim who was sixty-five 
years old or older,232 or is alleged to have committed any of the 
602(b) crimes.233 
With the passage of the GV JCPA, prosecutors may now file 
accusatory pleadings in adult criminal court against minors 
. aged sixteen and older if one of two factors is present.234 First, 
the minor must not be subject to the proposed automatic 
waiver found in the amendment to Section 602.235 Second, the 
minor must be alleged to have committed anyone of the 707(b) 
crimes against any victim,236 or any other crime when one of 
the following conditions is met: (1) the crime was committed 
against a victim who was at least sixty-five years old,237 (2) the 
crime was committed with the intent to intimidate or interfere 
228 
See id. Specifically, within § 26, refer to CAL. WELF. AND INST. CODE § 
707(d)(2)(a). 
229 
See id. Specifically, within § 26, refer to CAL. WELF. AND INST. CODE § 
707(d)(2)(b). 
230 
See id. Specifically, within § 26, refer to CAL. WELF. AND INST. CODE § 
707(d)(2)(c). 
231 
See id. Specifically, within § 26, refer to CAL. WELF. AND INST. CODE § 
707(d)(2)(c). 232 
See GVJCPA, supra note 1, § 26. Specifically, within § 26, refer to CAL. WELF. 
AND INST. CODE § 707(d)(2)(c). 233 . 
See id. Specifically, within § 26, refer to CAL. WELF. AND INST. CODE §§ 
707(d)(2)(c) and 602(b), which lists murder and several sex offenses as being grounds 
for automatic transfer. See also supra notes 186-196 and accompanying text. 234 
See Prosecutorial Direct Filing: Hearing on A.B. 987 Before the Assembly Comm. 
on Appropriations., 1997-1998 Legis. Sess. (Cal. 1998) (statement of Jerome McGuire, 
assembly publications) [hereinafter Hearing on 987]. 235 
See GVJCPA, supra note 1, § 18. See also supra notes 186-196 and accompany-
ing text. 236 
See CAL. WELF. AND INST. CODE § 707(b) (Deering 1999). 
237 
See GVJCPA, supra note 1, § 26. Specifically, within § 26, refer to CAL. WELF. 
AND INST. CODE § 707(d). 
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with the victim's constitutional rights,238 or (3) the crime was 
committed in conjunction with a criminal street gang.239 
C. STEPS TO PROTECT THE PuBLIC AND PROVIDE 
ACCOUNTABILITY 
In addition to changing the jurisdiction of the juvenile 
courts and establishing a system of prosecutorial waiver, the 
GVJCPA includes provisions intended to protect the public 
from juvenile offenders. 240 For example, the new Welfare and 
Institutions Code Section 602.5 requires juvenile courts to re-
port the records of all juvenile delinquents to the California 
Department of Justice.241 The Department of Justice now re-
tains all juvenile records, making them available to the 
bl' 242 pu IC. 
The GVJCPA's proposed changes also affect the manner in 
which minors are detained.243 Welfare and Institutions Code 
Section 625.3 previously provided that minors accused of using 
firearms in the commission of a felony be detained until a 
hearing is held before the court.244 The GV JCPA expands this 
Section,245 further requiring that minors alleged to have com-
mitted any of the 707(b) crimes, with or without a firearm, be 
detained until a hearing is held before the court. 246 This 
amendment keeps those minors off of the street and away from 
238 . See ,d. 
239 . See ,d. 
240 See id. § 2(K) (discussing the need to provide Californians with a safer state). 
241 See id. § 19. 
242 See GVJCPA, supra note I, § 19. 
243 See id. § 20. 
244 See CAL. WELF. AND INST. CODE § 625.3 (Deering 1999). 245 . 
See GVJCPA, supra note I, § 20. 
246 See id. 
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the public until a determination can be made of the offense 
committed.247 
Another method for holding minors accountable for their 
acts and requiring them to answer in court is found in the 
amendment to Welfare and Institutions Code Section 629.248 
Section 629 once allowed probation officers to require the mi-
nor and/or his parent or guardian to sign a promise to appear 
before the juvenile court as a condition of probation.249 In all 
cases involving a minor aged fourteen or older who is taken in 
to custody for the commission of or attempt to commit a felony, 
the amended Section 629 requires the minor's written, signed 
. t 250 promIse 0 appear. 
While many juvenile offenders are placed on probation in-
stead of committed to the youth authority, in many circum-
stances that option is not available.251 An amendment to Wel-
fare and Institutions Code Section 654.3 expands that list.252 
The circumstances now include any minor who is alleged to 
have committed any felony offense when he was at least four-
ld 253 teen years 0 . 
Finally, the GVJCPA limits the privacy and confidentiality 
rights of juvenile delinquents.254 Welfare and Institutions Code 
Section 676 already provided a lengthy list of offenses for 
247 S 'd ee t • 
248 See id. § 21. 
249 See CAL. WELF. AND INST. CODE § 629 (Deering 1999). 
250 See GVJCPA, supra note 1, § 21. Specifically, within § 21, refer to amendment 
of§ 629. 
251 . . See CAL. WELF. AND INST. CODE § 654.3 (Deenng 1999). For example, probatIon 
is not available where a minor has committed a 707(b) crime, sold or possessed a con-
trolled substance, assaulted a school employee with a firearm, committed any crime as 
part of a criminal street gang, has already been on probation, or has already been a 
ward of the court. See id. 
252 See GVJCPA, supra note 1, § 22. Specifically, within § 22, refer to amendment 
of§ 654.3. 
253 . See td. 
254 
See id. § 25. Specifically, within § 25, refer to amendment of § 676. 
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which juvenile proceedings may be open to the public255 and 
allowed the public disclosure of the minor's name under cer-
tain, limited circumstances. 256 The judge was given discretion, 
however, to keep the name and records of the proceedings con-
fidential, should she find good cause to do SO.257 The GVJCPA's 
amendments to Section 676 severely limit the interpretation of 
"good cause" to mean necessary to protect the personal safety 
of the minor, the victim, or the public at large, severely re-
stricting a judge's ability to keep juvenile delinquency pro-
ceedings closed to the public.258 The amendment imposes a 
requirement that the court conspicuously post a roster of all 
cases involving juvenile defendants, indicating where and 
when the hearings are taking place, and whether they are open 
to the public.259 
IV. CRITIQUE: WHY THE PROPOSED CHANGES WILL NOT FIX THE 
SYSTEM 
"The passage of this measure would result in the de facto 
destruction of the juvenile justice system as we know it. 
Many of the basic protections for young people - that 
they won't be tried in adult courts, that they will get a 
clean record and a fresh start when they turn eighteen -
will be gone. ,,260 
The GVJCPA is not the answer to California's juvenile 
crime problem. Rather than put an end to juvenile crime, it 
255 See CAL. WELF. AND INST. CODE § 676 (a)(1)-(28) (Deering 1999). For example, 
prior to the election, confidentiality was only limited in cases where a minor has com-
mitted crimes such as murder, arson, robbery, rape, kidnapping, burglary, and drive 
by shooting. See id. 
256 See id. § 676 (c). 
257 See id. § 676 (c), (d), (e). 
258 See GVJCPA, supra note 1, § 25. Specifically, within § 25, refer to amendment 
of CAL. WELF. AND INST. CODE § 676(c). 
259 
See id. Specifically, within § 25, refer to CAL. WELF. AND INST. CODE § 676(g). 
260 
See ACLU News, supra note 164. 
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will erode the jurisdiction of the juvenile court,261 transfer too 
much power to prosecutors,262 and dismantle what is left of the 
confidentiality provisions that were once the back bone of the 
juvenile justice system,263 Furthermore, the need for the 
GVJCPA is premature, rendering it unnecessary, as the truth 
behind the statistics proves that the juvenile crime problem in 
California is no bigger now than it ever has been,264 Also, 
similar laws in other parts of the country have been attacked 
as violative of due process,265 Furthermore, there is evidence 
that get-tough measures such as the GV JCPA do not work over 
time ,266 Finally, implementing and maintaining the GVJCPA 
, t hib't' 267 IS cos pro lIve, 
261 See infra notes 264-277 and accompanying text. 
262 See infra notes 278-307 and accompanying text. 
263 
See infra notes 308-328 and accompanying text. 
264 . . See Infra notes 329-338 and aCcompanYIng text. 
265 See infra notes 339-358 and accompanying text. 
266 
See infra notes 359-369 and accompanying text. 267 . 
See California Quick Reference Voter Information Guide for the March 7, 2000 
Primary Election at 6 [hereinafter Voter's Guidel. According to the summary of 
Proposition 21, the initial cost to the state is likely to be $750 million. See id. Subse-
quent state costs are likely to cost $330 million a year. See id. This does not include 
projected local costs, expected to amount to an initial cost between $200 and $300 
million, as well as yearly costs of up to $100 million. See id. These costs would be 
necessary to institute and maintain the GVJCPA, as the Act would fail without allo-
cating more money to prisons and police. See ACLU News, supra note 164. According 
to the American Civil Liberties Union (ACLU), most of this money would be used to 
incarcerate minors. See id. Despite all the money allocated, none would be spent on 
juvenile crime prevention. See id. However, it is well documented that money spent 
on prevention is much more effective than that spent on incarceration. See id. Al-
though not a study of juvenile crime prevention, the Rand Corporation determined 
that the money spent implementing California's controversial "Three Strikes" law 
would have prevented far more crime had it been used on preventative and deterrent 
programs. See id. 
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A. ERODING THE JURISDICTION OF THE JUVENILE COURTS 
Until 1971, the jurisdiction of California juvenile courts in-
cluded minors aged twenty-one and under.268 In 1971, Welfare 
and Institutions Code Section 602 was amended, lowering the 
age limit to eighteen.269 California voters have now lowered 
that age limit to fourteen in several circumstances.27o 
The California legislature's propensity to battle juvenile 
crime by restricting the jurisdiction of the juvenile courts is 
objectionable. It is a scheme that purports to lower juvenile 
crime statistics by virtue of changing the legal age of adult-
hood.271 Instead of lowering rates of juvenile crime, lowering 
the age limit simply funnels a larger number of minors in to 
the adult criminal justice system where they stand little 
chance of rehabilitation. 272 
Since age is extremely important to the effectiveness of the 
rehabilitation of juvenile offenders, the legislature is correct in 
considering it.273 However, the legislature would be better ad-
vised if it examined age in conjunction with how best to reha-
bilitate juvenile offenders, rather than how best to determine 
their guilt and punishment. Studies suggest that a minor's 
tendency to commit crime is age specific.274 Typically, a mi-
nor's involvement in crime peaks in his late teenage years, and 
declines in subsequent years.275 Such studies demonstrate that 
268 .• See CAL. WELF. AND INST. CODE § 602 (Deenng 1999). In partIcular, refer to the 
1971 amendment to § 602, lowering the upper age limit of the juvenile courts from age 
twenty-one to age eighteen. See id. 
269 See id. 
270 See GVJCPA, supra note 1, § 18. See also supra notes 186-196 and accompa-
nyingtext. 
271 See D'Ambra, supra note 12, at 299. 
272 See id. at 295. The reasons why the adult criminal justice system is ineffective 
in rehabilitating juvenile offenders are several. See infra notes 278-307 and accompa-
nying text. 
273 See D'Ambra, supra note 12, at 285. 
274 See id. 
275 S 'd ee l . 
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those who commit criminal offenses at young ages are not nec-
essarily on a fast track to becoming life-long criminals.276 
Rather, these studies confirm that such offenders are in a 
phase in their lives in which rehabilitation would be highly 
fli t · 277 e ec lve. 
B. THE PROBLEM INHERENT IN TRANSFERRING THE POWER TO 
THE PROSECUTORS 
As discussed above, the GV JCPA changes Section 707 of the 
Welfare and Institutions Code, shifting California's waiver sys-
tem from one of judicial waiver to one of prosecutorial 
waiver.278 The principle characteristic of the judicial waiver 
system is the tremendous amount of discretion and delibera-
tion that is required of a judge before the jurisdiction over a 
juvenile, his case, and subsequent treatment is waived to adult 
court.279 Just as important as the judicial discretion is the fact 
that the ultimate decision to transfer a juvenile's case is made 
by a judge, a third party with no interest in the case who 
reaches a decision in open court.280 Removing the judge from 
the decision-making process shifts all responsibility and power 
to t.ransfer a juvenile's case to the prosecutor.281 The prosecu-
tor, whose main interests lie in securing convictions and taking 
criminals off of the street, is far from a neutral third party.282 
Furthermore, the prosecutor's decision is made in private, iso-
276 See id. 
277 See id. 
278 . See Heanng on A.B. 987, supra note 234. 
279 See id. 
280 
See id. 
281 See Juvenile Justice: Prosecution of Minors in Adult Criminal Court: Hearing on 
A.B. 2143 Before the Senate Comm. on Crim. Proc., 1995-1996 Legis. Sess. (Cal. 1996) 
(author unavailable) [hereinafter Hearing on A.B. 2143] (discussing the reaction of the 
California Public Defenders Association.) See also Hearing on A.B. 987, supra note 
234. 
282 See id. 
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lated from both judicial review and public scrutiny, and can 
only be challenged when a discriminatory purpose is shown.283 
Prosecutorial waiver will likely result in a substantial re-
duction in the time, money, and resources that ordinarily 
would have been spent on Section 707 fitness hearings. 284 M-
ter all, the main criticism of California's previous judicial 
waiver system was that the fitness hearings required by Sec-
tion 707 were time consuming and expensive.285 However, 
while the shift to prosecutorial waiver would likely save money 
and time, there is a genuine and reasonable fear in the legal 
community that many young people who might otherwise have 
been given a second chance, would not be so fortunate under 
t ·I· 286 prosecu ona waIver. 
Further, supporters of prosecutorial waiver urge a shift 
away from judicial waiver in hopes that it will send a strong 
message that minors who commit adult crimes will face adult 
punishment.287 However, harsh measures such as these are far 
from effective.288 Studies cited before Congress indicate that 
most minors who are tried as adults do not receive punish-
ments any heavier than those they would have received from 
the juvenile court. 289 Additionally, these studies have produced 
no evidence to suggest that trying minors as adults reduces 
recidivism. 290 In fact, the recidivism rate among juveniles tried 
as adults tends to be higher than that among minors who are 
283 . 
See Heanng on AB. 987, supra note 234. 
284 
See Hearing on AB. 2143, supra note 281. 
285 
See id. 
286 
See id 
287 
See id. 
288 See id. (discussing a 1995 study conducted by the federal Office of Juvenile Jus-
tice and Delinquency Prevention, which examined the effect of prosecutorial waiver on 
juvenile crime in several jurisdictions). 
289 
See Hearing on AB. 2143, supra note 281. 
290 
See id. 
34
Golden Gate University Law Review, Vol. 30, Iss. 2 [2000], Art. 3
http://digitalcommons.law.ggu.edu/ggulrev/vol30/iss2/3
2000] JUVENILE JUSTICE 267 
treated by the juvenile justice system.291 Furthermore, the 
studies suggest that minors tried as adults are likely to become 
more violent than they might have become had they remained 
in the juvenile justice system.292 
In 1998, experts brought before the California legislature 
urged lawmakers to retain judicial waiver.293 Their primary 
reason was that the "adult crime, adult time" philosophy ig-
nores the significant intellectual and emotional differences 
that exist between adults and children.294 Implementing 
prosecutorial waiver sacrifices wayward children instead of 
reforming them and offering them a second chance.295 This, by 
far, is the best argument against deviating from judicial 
waiver.296 Children are not adults, and the states recognize 
this fact by treating minors as such in most other areas of the 
law. For example, a minor may not serve on a jury in any 
state.297 Additionally, most states have legislation that pre-
vents minors from driving or marrying without some form of 
291 
See Hearing on AB. 987, supra note 234 (comparing national juvenile crime sta-
tistics between jurisdictions that use judicial waiver, prosecutorial waiver, statutory 
waiver, or a combination of some or all three). The statistics indicate that judicial 
waiver is far more effective than the other forms of waiver in the war against juvenile 
crime. The reason for this seems to be that judicial waiver requires a judge, a neutral 
party, to make a fact specific determination as to the minor and his case before any 
decision to transfer the jurisdiction over the minor can be made. See id. See also 
D'Ambra, supra note 12, at 285. 
292 See Hearing on AB. 987, supra note 234. Along the same lines, minors who are 
incarcerated in adult prisons are much more likely to become career criminals upon 
release. The reasons for this are many, including the possibility of forming relation-
ships with older, more sophisticated and depraved criminals and repeat offenders; a 
greater exposure to harm and danger in the prisons; and the fact that these minors 
tend to be deprived of the education, counseling, and guidance that they would have 
received from the juvenile system. See D'Ambra, supra note 12, at 295. The effect of 
waiver is that the minor emerges from an adult prison sentence having grown up and 
matured in a criminal underworld, with no useful tools to use on the outside, and 
stigmatized by society as a lost cause. See id. 293 
See Hearing on AB. 987, supra note 234. 
294 
See id. 
295 
See id. 
296 
See id. 
297 
See e.g., Thompson v. Oklahoma, 487 U.S. 815, 840 (1988). 
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parental consent.298 Furthermore, minors in every state are 
prohibited from purchasing pornographic or obscene material 
with or without a parent's consent.299 In states where some 
form of legalized gambling is permitted, the vast majority of 
them either prohibit minors from gambling or require parental 
consent.300 Similarly, state laws that prohibit minors from 
drinking alcohol or purchasing tobacco products are common.301 
That the state ceases to treat children as children in cases 
where criminal activity is involved is not legally consistent 
with the states' overwhelming recognition that children should 
be treated differently than adults. 
The law draws a line between the rights and responsibili-
ties of adults and children. In Justice Sandra Day O'Connor's 
concurring opinion in Thompson v. Oklahoma, she described 
the basis for bright line rules such as those based on age as 
reflective of the "relevant social consensus.',a02 That consensus 
reflects the "settled notions of common decency" within the 
community concerning how children should be treated.303 The 
relevant social consensus that the Court relied upon in Thomp-
son prohibited a state from applying the death penalty to a 
fifteen year old based on society's value that children, regard-
less of their crimes, should not be put to death.304 Likewise, 
statutes that prohibit minors from drinking, gambling, mar-
rying, and smoking are based on social mores that grant cer-
tain rights and responsibilities to adults. The social mores ex-
clude children from certain activities because children are in-
298 See id. at 842 and 843. 
299 See id. at 845. 
300 See id. at 847. 
301 See e.g. CAL. BuS. AND PROF. CODE § 22958 (Deering 1999) (allowing the state to 
impose civil penalties against any person or business that provides tobacco products to 
any person under the age of eighteen). See also e.g. CAL. Bus. AND PROF. CODE § 
25658 (Deering 1999) (covering sale to and consumption by minors under the age of 21 
of alcohol, as well as providing criminal penalties). 302 . 
See Thompson, 487 U.S. 815 at 848 (O'Connor, J., concurring). 
303 See id. at 852 (O'Connor, J., concurring). 
304 See id. at 818. 
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capable of engaging in them with respect, responsibility, or a 
full understanding of their effects. 
A similar relevant social consensus exists when deciding to 
give prosecutors the power to waive juvenile cases to adult 
criminal court. That consensus supports the proposition that 
such an important power should remain in the hands of a 
judge.305 In a recent debate in San Francisco, California be-
tween five candidates for the District Attorney's office, a ques-
tion concerning the possible shift to prosecutorial waiver was 
posed.306 All candidates were unanimous in expressing concern 
that such a change would place too much power in the hands of 
prosecutors, and all stated that leaving the decision in the 
hands of a judge would best serve California.307 
C. PROTECTING THE PuBLIC: THE NEW GOAL OF THE JUVENILE 
JUSTICE SYSTEM? 
The portions of the GV JCPA that purport to protect the 
public are inconsistent with the intent of the creators of the 
original juvenile justice system.30S Although public protection 
was included in the Progressives' stated goals when developing 
the juvenile justice system, their primary goal was rehabilita-
tion.309 Unfortunately, these two goals are largely incompati-
305 
District Attorney Candidate Debate (Live, Golden Gate University School of 
Law, San Francisco, Cal., Oct. 8, 1999). The question posed was, "What is your posi-
tion on allowing prosecutors to file juvenile cases directly in adult criminal court?" 
The candidates were Matt Gonzalez, Steve Castleman, Terrence Hallinan, Bill Fazio, 
and Mike Schaefer. 
306
l d. 
307 [d. 
308 See supra notes 39-60 and 240-259 and accompanying text. 
309 
See generally Burke, supra note 18. 
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ble.310 Rather than rehabilitate, publicizing a minor's trouble 
with the law is more likely to handicap him in the future.3ll 
Proposals that increase a minor's accountability and re-
sponsibility are not necessarily dangerous. Requiring a minor 
to sign a promise to appear in court before being released from 
custody is a strong way of communicating to a minor the seri-
ousness of what he is accused of having done. The promise to 
appear holds the minor accountable and compels him to take 
responsibility for his actions. Furthermore, proposals that re-
quire longer periods of detention would also benefit, rather 
than punish the minor, if that detention keeps him away from 
a turbulent and dangerous home or street life.312 
However, proposals that restrict the confidentiality of the 
juvenile courts pose more serious problems.313 Preserving a 
juvenile offender's anonymity was part of the foundation upon 
which the Progressives built the original juvenile justice sys-
tem.314 Confidentiality and the cloak of privacy it shed over the 
minor was an essential part of protecting him from the social 
stigma associated with being convicted in a criminal proceed-
ing.315 For this reason, the Progressives fought to include con-
fidentiality in the juvenile justice system.316 In their opinion, 
all the rehabilitative efforts in the world would amount to 
nothing if a minor were to emerge from the juvenile justice 
system after having been publicly branded a "convict.',317 In 
fact, confidentiality was seen as being so critical to rehabilita-
tion that the Progressives likened any attempt to interfere 
310 See Kara E. Nelson, Comment: The Release of Juvenile Records Under Wiscon-
sin's Juvenile Justice Code: A New System of False Promises, 81 MARQ_ L_ REV. 1101, 
1107 (1998). 
311 See id. at 1106. 
312 See infra notes 373-385 and accompanying text for more discussion of the con-
tributing factors to the profile of a juvenile offender. 
313 See Nelson, supra note 310, passim. 
314 
See id. at 1119. 
315 
See Blum, supra note 34, at 351-352. 
316 
See Nelson, supra note 310, at 1118. 
317 . 
See Blum, supra note 34, at 352. 
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with it to an attempt to interfere with a doctor's treatment of a 
t t · t 318 rauma pa len. 
Critics of the juvenile justice system believe that it has 
failed in its mission to rehabilitate, and therefore state that no 
reason exists to maintain provisions for confidentiality.319 As a 
result, critics believe that the public is entitled to know the 
identities of the minors in the community who may pose a 
threat.32o However, should the element of confidentiality be 
dismantled, nearly every juvenile case in California could be-
come a headline on the evening news.321 
There are several reasons why public knowledge will not 
help the effort to rehabilitate juvenile delinquents. First, pub-
lic knowledge of a minor's criminal past will stigmatize him.322 
The social perception that delinquency of any kind is deviant, 
and therefore bad, has adverse effects on a minor's reassimila-
tion into society.323 Second, public knowledge prevents a minor 
from reassimilating in to society324 because it stands in the way 
of such important endeavors as getting a job, obtaining various 
licenses, and establishing financial credit.325 The minor's op-
portunity to participate fully in society is crippled due to the 
adverse effect knowledge of the adjudication could have on his 
education and job prospects.326 Third, public knowledge creates 
notoriety.327 This notoriety often .contributes to recidivism, as 
318 See id. at 355. 
319 See id. at 369. 
320 
See id. at 349, 369 and 388. 
321 
See id. at 349. 
322 See Nelson, supra note 310, at 1149. 
323 See id. at 1150. 
324 
See id. at 115l. 
325 
See id. at 1151 note 369. 
326 
See id. at 1153. 
327 See Nelson, supra note 310, at 1149. 
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some minors commit crimes simply to gain social recognition 
d 328 an acceptance. 
D. THE TRUTH BEHIND THE STATISTICS PROVES THAT JUVENILE 
CRIME IS NOT SPIRALING OUT OF CONTROL 
Supporters of the GV JCPA often claim that juvenile crime 
is skyrocketing out of contro1.329 The drafters of the GVJCPA 
even included statistics that buoy this position within its 
text. 330 However, when considering this evidence, a familiar 
quote comes to mind: ''There are three types of lies; lies, damn 
lies, and statistics.,,:J31 
The statistics relied upon by the GV JCPA should scare and 
shock the average voter in to believing that juvenile crime is 
growing at an uncontrollable rate. 332 However, that is simply 
not the case.333 Statistics such as those cited in the GVJCPA 
are extremely misleading and do not paint an accurate picture 
of the true nature of juvenile crime.334 
For example, the statistics fail to reflect the fact that there 
has been little change, if any, in the correlation between adult 
and juvenile crime rates in California.335 Furthermore, the sta-
tistics cited do not reveal the thirty percent decrease in both 
juvenile and adult crime between 1990 and 1994.336 Any statis-
328 See id. 
329 
See supra notes 161-182 and accompanying text. 
330 See id. 
331 See THE OXFORD DICTIONARY OF QUOTATIONS 249: 13 (4th ed. 1992) (attributing 
the above quote to Benjamin Disraeli, a British Conservative politician and novelist, 
in MARK TwAIN AUTOBIOGRAPHY (1924)). 332 See Vincent Schiraldi and Jason Zeidenberg, Runaway Juvenile Crime? The 
Context of Juvenile Crime Arrests, a study by the Justice Policy Institute (1998) 
[hereinafter JPI Arrest Study]. 
333 
See id. 
334 
See id. 
335 
See JPI Curfew Study, supra note 121. 
336 See id. 
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tical indication that there has been a marked increase in juve-
nile crime is likely tied to a higher number of curfew arrests, 
as well as an increase in the number of reported crimes.337 
However, the GVJCPA's use of statistics is intended to prove 
that violent juvenile crime is on the rise, despite the fact that 
further inquiry shows that such a contention is simply 
338 
untrue. 
E. PROSECUTORIAL WAIVER MAy VIOLATE DUE PROCESS 
Although the United States Supreme Court has not ruled 
on the constitutionality of transferring a minor to adult court 
without the benefit of a fitness hearing,339 it did publish a dis-
sent which addressed that very question.340 At issue in U.S. v. 
Bland was whether prosecutorial waiver denies minors due 
process oflaw.341 Jerome Bland, sixteen years old, was tried as 
an adult for the crime of armed robbery in Washington D.C.342 
Under an Act of Congress, the United States Attorney had the 
authority to waive juvenile offenders to adult criminal court 
without the benefit of a fitness hearing.343 Bland moved to 
dismiss the indictment, arguing that the court did not have 
jurisdiction over him because the system of prosecutorial 
waiver denied him due process oflaw.344 
The United States District Court for the District of Colum-
bia denounced the statutory scheme that allowed prosecutorial 
waiver as a "short cut," inspired by the "pressures generated by 
337 S 'd ee I • 
338 See GVJCPA, supra note 1, § (2). See also JPI Arrest Study, supra note 332. 
339 
See supra notes 201-222 and accompanying text (discussing judicial waiver, as it 
was codified in California prior to the March 7, 2000 election). 340 
See Bland v. U.S., 412 U.S. 909 (1973) (Douglas, J., dissenting; Brennan and 
Marshall, J.J., joining in the dissent). 341 See U.S. v. Bland, 330 F. Supp. 34 (1971). 
342 
See id. 
343 
See id. at 35. 
344 
See id. at 34. 
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the growing [juvenile] crime waive.',345 The court attacked this 
short cut as having been implemented merely to avoid the "dif-
ficulties" associated with judicial waiver,346 primarily the fit-
ness hearings. 347 The court then condemned the unlimited 
power that such a scheme places in the hands of the prosecutor 
as streamlining the juvenile justice system "at the expense of 
the individual's right to due process safeguards.',348 The court 
further criticized prosecutorial waiver as carrying with it a 
presumption of guilt, as well as an assumption that most juve-
nile offenders are hardened criminals who are beyond help.349 
The district court held that the statute in question in fact vio-
lated due process, and therefore dismissed the indictment 
against Jerome Bland.350 
The Court of Appeals reversed the judgment of the District 
Court.351 When asked to decide once and for all whether prose-
cutorial waiver violates a minor's due process, the United 
States Supreme Court denied certiorari.352 Nevertheless, Jus-
tices Douglas, Brennan, and Marshall published a strong dis-
sent on that issue.353 The dissenting justices wrote that certio-
rari to this question should have been granted because prose-
cutorial waiver raises two "substantial" questions worthy of the 
Court's attention.354 Of primary importance, the dissent urged 
that a serious constitutional question is raised any time a mi-
nor is faced with the possibility of arbitrarily being treated as 
345 See id. at 36-37. 
346 See Bland, 330 F. Supp. 34 at 36. 
347 See id. See also Kent v. U.S., 383 U.S. 541 (1966). In Kent, the U.S. Supreme 
Court described the fitness hearing as "critically important" to a minor's due process 
rights. 348 See Bland, 330 F. Supp. 34 at 36. 
349 . See £d. at 37. 
350 See id. at 39. 
351 See U.S. v. Bland, 472 F.2d 1329 (1972); cert. denied, 412 U.S. 909 (1973). 
352 See Bland v. U.S., 412 U.S. 909 (1973) (Douglas, J., dissenting; Brennan and 
Marshall, J.J., joining). 
353 S 'd ee £ • 
354 See id. at 911 
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an adult crimina1.355 Denying a minor a fitness hearing de-
prives him of any opportunity to rebut the prosecution's as-
sumption that he should cease to be treated like other minors, 
and thereby violates due process.356 Further, a prosecutor's 
decision to waive a minor to adult court is immune from judi-
cial review.357 As a result, the decision is made in isolation by 
someone who is not governed by procedural rules, leaving ripe 
the possibility for unchecked abuse of discretion.358 
F. SIMILAR ATTEMPTS IN OTHER STATES HAVE NOT WORKED 
The final reason why the GV JCPA is not the answer to 
California's juvenile crime problem is that it simply will not 
work. Other states, most notably the state of Washington, 
have adopted similar get-tough measures only to find that ju-
venile crime remains a problem.359 Washington abandoned its 
rehabilitative juvenile justice system in favor of a punitive sys-
tem in 1977.360 The change was made for a variety of reasons, 
namely a perceived rise in juvenile crime, and what was con-
sidered by the legislature to be an insensitivity towards public 
safety and protection.361 Washington's Juvenile Justice Act of 
1977 was similar to the GVJCPA in several ways: first, it 
abandoned closed courts for juvenile proceedings;362 second, it 
opened juvenile files for public inspection;363 third, it created 
provisions for both statutory and prosecutorial waiver;364 and 
355 
See id. 
356 See id. 
357 See Bland, 412 U.S. 909 at 911. 
358 See id. at 913. 
359 
See Jeffrey K. Day, Comment: Juvenile Justice in Washington: A Punitive Sys-
tem in Need of Rehabilitation, 16 PuGET SOUND L. REv. 399 (1992). 360 See id. at 399. 
361 
See id. at 407-408. Note that these reasons are substantially similar to the rea-
sons cited by supporters of the GVJCPA. See e.g. GVJCPA, supra note 1, § (2). 362 
See Day, supra note 359 at 410. 
363 See id. at 412. 
364 
See id. at 422. 
43
Raymond: Juvenile Justice
Published by GGU Law Digital Commons, 2000
276 GOLDEN GATE UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW [Vol. 30:2 
fourth, it based sentencing on the crime committed, rather 
than on the treatment required by the particular minor.365 
Only fifteen years after it was enacted, Washington's punitive 
system was criticized as a failure.366 The cost of maintaining 
the system had become prohibitive.367 Additionally, the seri-
ousness and frequency of juvenile crime continued to rise.36S 
F~rthermore, the state's recidivism rate did not improve.369 
V. TREATING JUVENILE CRIME AS BOTH A SOCIAL PROBLEM 
AND A LEGAL PROBLEM AND REASONS TO REPEAL THE GV JCPA 
California's juvenile justice system has been examined and 
the ways in which the GVJCPA has changed it have been con-
sidered. Two primary facts exist upon which all parties can 
agree. First, juvenile courts were conceived at a time when the 
majority of offenses committed by minors were status offenses, 
such as skipping school and shoplifting penny-candy from the 
corner store.370 Second, in recent years juvenile crime has 
taken a far more serious form. From petty drug offenses and 
violent robberies to capital murders and rapes, criminal activ-
ity committed by minors is becoming a more serious concern 
across the country.371 California is no exception. 
Despite their importance, these reasons alone are not suffi-
cient to mandate treating minors as adults under criminal law. 
Now, more than ever before, law makers should strive to reha-
bilitate juvenile offenders rather than sacrifice them to the 
adult criminal justice system. The relevant social consensus 
referred to in Justice O'Connor's concurrence in Thompson v. 
365 
See id. at 428. 
366 See id. 
367 
See Day, supra note 359 at 428. 
36S 
See id. 
369 
See id. 
370 
See D'Ambra, supra note 12, at 282. 
371 
See id. 
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Oklahoma requires it.372 In California, the social consensus 
requires us to treat our children as children, even when they 
have committed terrible crimes. As a result, juvenile crime 
must be viewed not only as a legal problem, but as a social 
problem as well. 
A. TREATING JUVENILE CRIME AS A SOCIAL PROBLEM 
The first step in treating juvenile crime as a social problem 
is to determine the profile of the average juvenile offender.373 
These minors often have similar social and personal charac-
teristics.374 For example, juvenile offenders typically come 
from an impoverished upbringing, having grown up with sub-
standard housing, healthcare, and educational experiences.375 
Socially, these minors tend to be alienated from their families 
and other children, and are often rebellious or contentious with 
parents and authority figures. 376 Furthermore, these minors 
are more likely than others to have been neglected by their 
parents, or sexually or physically abused by a parent or other 
care-taker.377 It is also highly likely that these minors come 
from neighborhoods where poverty, drug abuse, and crime are 
rampant.378 Additionally, the typical juvenile offender either 
lacks a peer group or has one that is extremely influential in a 
t . 379 nega Ive way. 
The profile of the average juvenile offender poses numerous 
social problems that demand serious legislative attention in 
the areas of poverty, physical abuse, drugs, neglect, crime, 
housing, and education. Legislators must make a concerted 
372 
See Thompson, 487 U.S. 815 at 847. 
373 See D'Ambra, supra note 12, at 300. 
374 . 
See td. at 299. 
375 
See id. 
376 
See id. 
377 . See td. 
378 See D'Ambra, supra note 12, at 300. 
379 
See id. 
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effort to urge every governmental agency to work together to 
mend these holes. This effort must include substantial gov-
ernment involvement in areas such as pre-natal care, educa-
tion, job training, housing, and community programs to pre-
vent and intervene in juvenile crime.380 The legislative efforts 
must also take the form of aggressive funding and implemen-
tation of preventive and informative programs in schools and 
communities. 
A second tactic in treating juvenile crime as a social prob-
lem is to train teachers and other authority figures in 
mentoring skills.38l Many minors often lack exposure to caring 
adults,382 which inevitably contributes to their delinquency.383 
However, there is evidence that training teachers and other 
school administrators to mentor students has a positive impact 
on juvenile crime.384 Studies conducted by the Federal Office of 
Juvenile Justice and Delinquency Prevention prove that 
mentoring reduces drug and alcohol use, aggressive behavior, 
d . d' fi 385 an Improves aca emlC per ormance. 
B. TREATING JUVENILE CRIME AS A LEGAL PROBLEM 
Juvenile crime must also be treated as a legal problem. A 
main criticism of the current juvenile justice system is that it 
has failed in its efforts to rehabilitate.386 However, this does 
not mean that rehabilitation should be set aside as a legal 
goal. Rather, effective rehabilitation must become a legislative 
priority. Instead of treating all juvenile offenders alike, reha-
380 See id. at 301 (discussing U.S. Attorney General Janet Reno's proposal for a 
high level of governmental involvement in curbing juvenile crime). 
381 Statement of the Hon. Shay Bilchik before the House Subcommittee on Early 
Childhood, Youth, and Families, May 21, 1997 [hereinafter Statement of Shay Bil-
chikl. 
382 See D'Ambra, supra note 12, at 299. 
383 See id. 
384 See Statement of Shay Bilchik, supra note 381. 
385 
See id. 
386 See Blum, supra note 34, at 369. 
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bilitation must be tailored to fit first-time offenders, repeat 
offenders, and serious and violent offenders.387 If the rehabili-
tative methods currently employed have been unsuccessful, 
that failure may be due to the fact that the system is 
outdated.388 Rather than surrender efforts to rehabilitate, the 
legislature and the courts must focus more attention on devel-
oping better, more effective means of rehabilitation. Both the 
legislature and the courts must strive to make the scope of 
. 389 treatment fit the offense and the offender. 
1. First-time and Misdemeanor Juvenile Offenders 
Because of the high rate of success in communities that 
. have instituted diversion programs,390 California's legislature 
should establish a state-wide system of diversion programs. 
Instead of forcing first-time and misdemeanor juvenile offend-
ers through the juvenile courts, diversion programs would be 
used to rehabilitate those minors and provide the community 
and victims with accountability.391 First-time and misde-
meanor juvenile offenders would be rehabilitated, and the sys-
tem would have more room and resources for minors who pose 
a greater threat to the public and require more attention. 
2. Repeat Juvenile Offenders 
Minors who fail to complete their contracts under the diver-
sion programs,392 or who complete their contracts yet return to 
crime, are proper candidates for the juvenile court.393 How-
. ever, if the rehabilitative methods currently used are to be ef-
fective, they must be reformed. Legislative attention must be 
placed on reforming these minors emotionally, physically, and 
387 
See Day, supra note 359 at 42l. 
388 See Burke, supra note 18, at 1027. 
389 
See Day, supra note 359 at 42l. 
390 
See Cooper, supra note 152. 
391 
See id. 
392 
See id. 
393 
See Day, supra note 359 at 420. 
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practically, so that through their treatment they become val-
ued members of society.394 
Rehabilitation may be achieved in a campus setting where 
juvenile offenders are sent after being adjudicated 
delinquent.395 A school reflects the traditional notion of how an 
effective juvenile institution would be designed.396 Rather than 
a prison or dormitory-like facility, an institute modeled after a 
school would make it easier for officials to classify juvenile of-
fenders by criteria such as age, offense, and gender.397 Small 
groups of minors with similar delinquent and social histories 
should be placed together. All juvenile offenders would experi-
ence extensive counseling, in both individual and group ses-
sions. Through treatment, each juvenile would be taught the 
reasons why his actions led to certain consequences.398 Addi-
tionally, the minors would learn responsibility by cooking, 
cleaning, and having jobs on campus. Further, education and 
job training must be stressed. As a result, the juvenile leaves 
the youth authority confident, skilled, and equipped to be a 
productive member of society. 
The above plan provides effective rehabilitation by fully ad-
dressing the emotional and physical needs of juvenile offend-
ers, yet the reform remains incomplete by modern standards. 
The public demands accountability. To address this concern, 
features of the diversion programs should be included.399 For 
example, written apologies, restitution, and community service 
should be performed in conjunction with the minor's detention. 
394 S 'd ee I • 
395 See Marshall Wilson, Plan for New Juvenile Hall OK'd, San Mateo County 
Wants Facility to Offer Preventive Programs, S.F. CHRONICLE, February 10, 1999, at 
A16. 396 See Day, supra note 359, at 423. 
397 S 'd ee I . 
398 S 'd ee I . 
399 Recall, however that the purpose of a diversion program is to spare the minor 
the experience of being put through the juvenile justice system. See supra notes 146-
160 and accompanying text. 
48
Golden Gate University Law Review, Vol. 30, Iss. 2 [2000], Art. 3
http://digitalcommons.law.ggu.edu/ggulrev/vol30/iss2/3
2000] . JUVENILE JUSTICE 281 
This step would provide accountability, thereby completing the 
fi 400 re orm. 
3. Serious, Violent, and / or Felony Juvenile Offenders 
Critics of the current juvenile justice system are correct in 
asserting that because juvenile crime has taken a violent turn 
in recent years, the system as it stands is insufficient to treat 
the more dangerous perpetrators.401 However, judicial 
waiver402 remains the appropriate method to transfer these 
more violent, threatening minors to adult criminal court.403 
Judicial waiver stops just short of abandoning the most threat-
ening juvenile offenders.404 While it provides the state with a 
vehicle to prosecute dangerous minors as adult criminals,405 
judicial waiver requires the court to conduct a thorough inves-
tigation into the minor's history, propensity, and amenability 
to the rehabilitative services offered by the juvenile justice sys-
tem.406 The benefit of judicial waiver that does not exist with 
prosecutorial waiver is that it considers the interests of the 
minor as well as the interests ofthe state and the community. 
C. THE ULTIMATE GOAL 
The ultimate goal of any plan to reform the juvenile justice 
system must be to enable all minors to become valued, produc-
tive members of society. This goal will be achieved if minors 
are taught to communicate with parents, teachers and each 
other. However, this goal is only be possible if minors are 
given alternatives to crime. Thus, the state must fund aggres-
sive juvenile crime prevention programs that target the entire 
community, involving family, schools, and social centers. 
400 
See Day, supra note 359, at 421. 
401 
See id. 
402 See CAL. WELF. AND INST. CODE § 707 (Deering 1999). 
403 
See supra notes 201-222 and accompanying text. 
404 
See id. 
405 S 'd ee I • 
406 See CAL. WELF. AND INST. CODE § 707 (Deering 1999). 
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For minors that have already become part of the juvenile 
justice system, it is critical that they are treated, and not sim-
ply punished. A treatment-based juvenile justice system can 
work.407 For example, Massachusetts abandoned its punitive 
juvenile justice system in the early 1970's, replacing it with a 
tre~tment-based system.408 The transition between the two 
systems was not without difficulty, but the results have been 
idea1.409 In Massachusetts, juvenile offenders are placed in 
small, community based programs with a high staff-to-resident 
ratio.410 The program emphasizes group and individual coun-
seling, typically shaped by the juvenile offenders' 
backgrounds.411 The Massachusetts program also pays close 
attention to each juvenile offender's reentry to society.412 As a 
result of the shift, Massachusetts has seen a below average 
recidivism rate, as well as an overall drop in the juvenile crime 
413 
rate. 
D. GROUNDS FOR REPEAL 
There are many reasons why the GV JCPA should be re-
pealed, invalidated, or, at the very least, modified. The rea-
sons discussed supra in Part W 14 are all pertinent to an argu-
ment supporting repeal. Eroding the jurisdiction of the juve-
nile courts, giving the prosecution full reign over a minor's 
fate, and destroying confidentiality will do nothing to mend the 
problem of juvenile crime in California.415 Furthermore, the 
GVJCPA presents potential constitutional concerns. In addi-
407 See Day, supra note 359, at 438. 
408 
See id. 
409 See id. 
410 See id. 
411 See id. at 439. 
412 See Day, supra note 359, at 438. 
413 See id. at 438-439. 
414 S d' ee supra note8 260-369 an accompanymg text. 
415 See id. 
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tion to a due process challenge,416 the complexity and broad 
scope of the GV JCPA may pose a violation of the California 
Constitution's "single subject" rule for all initiatives.417 If 
challenged in the courts, the unconstitutional portions of the 
GVJCPA could be severed from the rest of the initiative. Al-
ternatively, the entire act could be invalidated. 
There are several ways to repeal an initiative approved by 
the voters. One of the best ways to do this is through the ini-
tiative process. The California Constitution provides that the 
citizens of the state may propose initiatives which are then 
submitted to the state's voters.418 Thus, Californians who re-
main opposed to the passage of the GV JCPA should create an 
initiative that would repeal Proposition 21. However, if Cali-
fornians do not place an initiative in the next major election, 
they may still lobby the legislature to repeal or amend the 
GVJCPA.419 Due to its statutory construction, repealing the 
GVJCPA through the legislature would require a two-thirds 
vote of both houses or a voter approved statute.420 Further, if 
Californians fail to repeal the GVJCPA through either legisla-
tion or the initiative process, the state courts may be employed 
to invalidate all or part of the GVJCPA.421 This method is of-
ten used by California voters when they are not pleased with 
the outcome of an election.422 Nevertheless, it is within the 
power of the courts to review initiatives for their constitution-
416 See id. 
417 See CAL. CONST. art. II, § 8, cl. d (reading, "an initiative measure embracing 
more than one subject may not be submitted to the electors or have any effect."). 
418 See CAL. CONST. art. II, § 8. The initiative power is that of the people to propose 
law and reject or accept it. See id. at cl. a. 419 See CAL. CONST. art. II, § 10. 
420 See id. 
421 See e.g. Kopp v. Fair Political Practices Comm., 11 Cal. 4th 607 (1995) (standing 
for the proposition that the court's ability to reform statutes enacted by the voters 
does not interfere with the legislature's authority to repeal or amend the initiative). 422 See e.g. Senate of California v. Jones, 21 Cal. 4th 1142 (1999) (declaring Proposi-
tion 24 - which would have reduced the salaries of states legislators - unconstitu-
tional, and removing it from the March 7, 2000 ballot before the election); Bramberg v. 
Jones, 20 Cal. 4th 1045 (1999) (attacking the constitutionality of Proposition 225, an 
initiative addressing congressional term limits). 
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ality.423 All three of these methods, the electoral, the political, 
and the judicial, should be exhausted in attempts to repeal or 
invalidate the GV JCP A. 
VI. CONCLUSION 
The critical problem with the GV JCPA is that it punishes 
minors for their transgressions without rehabilitating them. 
By approving the GV JCPA, Californians have established a 
punitive juvenile justice system and pushed the state closer to 
abandoning the hope that lies behind the rehabilitative phi-
losophy. In so doing, California continues to avoid making any 
commitment to repairing the underlying causes of juvenile 
crime. As a result, both juvenile crime and its contributing 
causes, poverty, drugs, and neglect, continue to exist and 
flourish. 
Rather than sacrifice what is left of the rehabilitative juve-
nile justice system, Californians should push for a repeal of the 
GVJCPA. At the same time, legislators must focus their en-
ergy and resources on improving the services offered by the 
current system. Developing state-wide diversion programs and 
aggressive juvenile crime prevention programs, reinforcing 
rehabilitation within the current system, and retaining judicial 
waiver are all tools that will benefit California as a state, and 
its minors as a generation. 
Sara Raymond" 
423 
See CAL. CONST. art. II, § B . 
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